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CAPITAL ACCUMULATION, INFLATION AND
LONG-RUN CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL
OBJECTIVES
By F. VAN DER PLOEG'
1. Introduction
THts paper is concerned with the issue of whether policy objectives in an
interdependent world are better achieved when governments cooperate than
when national decisions are arrived at in a competitive fashion. The layman
might take for granted that cooperation between governments would definitely
make things better than they otherwise could be. However, most of the
theoretical and empirical findings presented in the macrceconomic literature
have hardly supported the layman's view. For example, Carloui and Taylor
(1985) show that the gains from concerted government actions are negligible
in an empirical~ study based on a two-country model where capital is perfectly
mobile, exchange rates are flexible and labour markets behave according to the
staggered wage-setting hypothesis (Taylor, 1979, 1980). In such a model
loog-run output is at its full-employment level and cannot be a(ïected by
government policy, although there is a long-run trade-oflbetween the variances
of output and prices. Carloui and Taylor (1985) find that individual govern-
ments can achieve the optimal trade-olí between the asymptotic variability of
output and prices just as well by choosing their own monetary rttles as by
cooperation.
A similar conclusion is reached by Miller and Salmon (1985) in a two-country
model where output is demand-determined in the short run and where there is
risk-neutral arbitrage between domestic and loreign government bonds. In this
study there is no long-run conflict between the level of output (given by a
vertical Phillips-curve in the long run) and inflation either. A flexible exchange
rate allows each country to choose independently the desired rate of change in
the domestic price level. Each country minimises a welfare function, which is
the integral of a weighted combination of the square of core inflation and
squared deviations of output from its natural rate. Again, no long-run gains
from coordination are found, so that coordination is concerned with the efficient
adjustment towards given long-run targets. The same problem is discussed in
the work of Currie and Levine (1985) and Oudiz and Sachs (1985). All these
studies are based on "neo-Keynesian" models, where the level of activity is
' The original idca for the problem discussed in this paper arose out of a number of stimulaling
dixussions with my friend and colleague, Giancarlo Marini. 1 am very grateful lo him for these
discussions and constructive commenta on this paper. 7'he paper has also benefited from the
extremely detailed and constructive comments of the anonymous referees and from seminar
parlicipants at the Macroeconomic Workshop, Paris; Helsinki University; Birkbeck Colkge and
Warwick University. Obviously, 1 take full responsibility for all errors and omissions. This paper
is based on research funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (UK) and the Centre
for Economic Policy Research, l,ondon.
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afiected by monetary shocks in the adjustment to equilibrium, even though the
long-run equilibrium level of output itself is given and cannot be afTected by
current, past or prospective future policy actions. One typically finds that
non-cooperative policy formulation Ieads to too tight monetary policy and to
too loose fiscal policy in the process of adjustment, so that non-cooperative
disinflation occurs excessively fast.
Similar conclusions about the desirability of coordinated policies have been
obtained in flexible price, rational expectations models with pre-negotiated
nominal wages. An example is given by Buiter and Eaton ( 1985), who show
that the Nash solution is optimal when the objective in each country is
minimising fluctuations of actual output around its ex-ante or ex-post natural
level. They also point out that gains from policy coordination can only arise
when the number of policy targets exceeds the number of policy instruments.
This means that in models where there is no long-run trade-oft between output
and inflation, the analysis may as well (as in Buiter and Eaton, 1985) be confined
to one objective at a time, say the minimisation of fluctuations of output around
its ex-post frictionless level. In fact, if the only problem is due to the fact that
spot labour contracts are not executable, the above criterion appears to be the
most sensible one to adopt. A convincing welfare-theoretical rationale for this
view has recently been provided by Aizenman and Frenkel ( 1985).
The purpose of the present paper is to investigate whether substantial gains
from cooperation might arise in the presence of a genuine long-run inflation-
output trade-ófï (when governments can pre-commit themselves to their
announced policies). Under conditions of complete debt neutrality, capital
accumulation and money bearing no rate of interest there is, as in the case of
a closed economy ( e.g. Tobin, 1965; Fischer, 1979; Begg, 1980; Buiter, 1981),
a genuine long-run trade-oB between inflation and output. This trade-ofï is
based on a two-country version of the Mundell-Tobin efïect. It is assumed that
neither country likes inflation; the rationale for the costs of inflation are the
usual ones presented in the literature ( e.g. Fischer and Modiglíani, 1978). Both
countries, however, desire high levels of activity. The interesting feature of such
a two-country model is that high inflation in one country leads to a reduction
in the world real interest rate and therefore to higher output in both countries.
This means that there is an incentive to trans[er the burden of bearing high
inflation to the neighbouring country. Here the case for cooperation becomes
much stronger and is also relevant in the long run, for if both countries are
prepared to live with higher anticipated inflation rates a mutual higher level of
activity and of economic welfare could be achieved.
However, this unambiguous policy prescription may not be robust with
respect to plausible changes in the specification of the model. Retaining the
assumption of full price flexibility, a"Keynesian" flavour can be introduced
by rejecting Barro's (1974) ultra-rational Ricardian hypothesis and therefore
allowing bonds to be part of net wealth and consumption to be afïected, to
some extent, by disposable income. In other words, the restrictive hypothesis
of perfect capital markets is relaxed so that private agents are unable to borrow
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(against future life-time expected earnings) on the same terms as governments
can do.' In such a context, lower monetary growth leads to less seignorage
revenues and therefore forces the servicing of a smaller government debt, so
that there is a possibility of lower wealth and consumption despite higher
holdings of real money balances. Hence, there is a possibility that a reduction
in inflation increases investment and output in the long run so that there is no
policy dilemma. However, this possibility seems rather unlikely.
Section 2 sets up a perfect-foresight model of interdependent economies with
capital accumulation, inflation and efficient exchange markets. Section 3
examines the long-run conflict in international objectives under the two
alternative specifications discussed above. Section 4 presents a linearized version
of the model of interdependent economies presented in Sections 2 and 3. Section
5 analyses the potential long-run gains from coordination by comparing various
competitive and cooperative outcomes. It first considers the "rules" outcome
where each government can pre-commit itself, uis-d-uis the private sector,
to its announced present and future monetary policies. Here cooperation is
unambiguously superior to competitive policy formulation, since coordination
achieves a reduction in the world real rate of interest and an increase in global
activity. However, this "rules" outcome suflers from time inconsistency as each
government has an incentive to levy a"surprise" inflation tax on its private
sector. Therefore Section 5 also considers credible or time-consistent monetary
policies. It shows that the resulting "discretionary" outcomes for cooperation
are no diflerent from the time-consistent outcomes under competitive policy
formulation and both lead to excessive monetary growth rates and higher levels
of activity than under coordinated or competitive policy formulation with
pre-commitment. Hence, in the absence of binding contracts or reputational
forces, cooperation is futile. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Capital accumulation and inflation in interdependent economies
Consider two interdependent economies with a floating exchange rate and
perfect capital mobility. There is imperfect substitution between home and
forcign goods, although home and foreign government bonds are freely
tradeable without cost and therefore perfect substitutes. Both labour and capital
are immobile. Since this paper is mainly concerned with long-run conflict in
international objectives, prices in both the goods and asset markets are assumed
to be flexible and agents are assumed to have perfect foresight. All foreign
variables and expressions are denoted by an asterisk.
Total demand in the home country, Y, consists of consumption of home goods
by home, Co(.), and foreign households, CM'(~), and of gross investment. The
' An alternative formulation is based on private sector agents having, instead of infinite lives, a
finite probability of dcath ( Blanchard, 1985; Marini and van der Ploeg, 1988). However, note thal
Gale (1983) has shown that Ricardian equivalence can hold in disequilibrium Keynesian models.
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IS-curve ignores the efTects of the real rates of interest and is given by
Y- Co(PYo~Pc, Y, V) t IC t bK f CM'(P'Yo~~P~, y, V'),
CD~ CM' ~ ~~ ~~~ (2.l )
where Yo, V, K, S, y, M, P and Pc denote disposable income, real wealth, capital,
the depreciation rate, the real exchange rate, the nominal money supply, the
price of home goods and the consumers' price index of the home country,
respectively. Home consumption and exports of home goods increase when
home real disposable income or wealth increases and when the real exchange
rate depreciates. It is straightforward to allow for a negative etiect of the home
real interest rate on home consumption and of the foreign real interest rate on
exports, but this does not afTect the qualitative properties of the reduced form
and is therefore ignored. Goods market equilibrium is given by
Y - j(K, N) (2.2)
where the supply of goods follows from a concave constant-returns-to-scale
production function, j(K, N). The supply of labour abstracts from wealth and
in[ertemporal substitution eR'ects and is given by
N - Ns(wc), Ns ~ 0~ (2.3)
where wc is the real consumers' wage. The special case of an inelastic supply
of labour corresponds to NS - 0. The demand for labour follows from fN - w
and is given by
N- Kno(w), nó c ~, (2.4)
where w- wcPc~P is the real producers' wage. The LM-curve is given by
MIPc - L(PY~Pc, r) - ~-(Y r)PIPa Lr 1 0, L, c 0, (2.5)
where r is the nominal rate of interest. The real demand for money increases
when real income or the price of consols increases. It is assumed that L(~) is
homogeneous of degree one with respect to its first argument.
The policy variable of each government is its monetary growth rate,
Ei - l~1 ~M or p', which it can increase by purchasing consols. For simplicity,
the efiects of the government's fiscal policies are suppressed, so that the
government's budget constraint can be written as
NM t B~r - B, (2.6)
where B.is the number of outstanding bonds. The servicing of the government
debt has to be financed, cither by printing money or by issuing new bonds. It
has been assumed that bonds are not necessarily part of private sector wealth,
since financing of the public sector borrowing requirement by bonds may be
perceived as an immediate reduction in disposable income by the discounted
stream of future taxes required to service the increased government debt:
V-[PK t M t aB~r]~Pc, 0~ a~ 1, (2.7)
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where a is the extent to which government bonds are net wealth. It is assumed
that changes in the stock of net foreign assets are a negligible proportion of
changes in total financial wealth, so that the efíects of current-account dynamics
can be ignored.~ With the aid of (2.tí) disposable income can be defined as
Yo - Y f( B~P) -(1 - a)(B~rP) - Y f a(B~P) fO- a)EiL, L- M~P,
. (2.8)
so that an increase in the monetary growth rate implies less bond-finance, less
future taxes and therefore a higher level of disposable income. The case a- 0
corresponds to full debt-neutrality and relies on perfect capital markets and
infinite livcs or dynasties ( e.g. Barro, 1974). In that case there are no liquidity
constraints and thus C~ - C~ - 0 may be a reasonable assumption. The case
a~ 0, Co ~ 0 and CM ~ 0 corresponds to when agents are not ultrarational
or not altruistic or to when capital markets are imperfect.
The consumers' price index is given by
Pc - H(P, P'E), Ht, H2 ~ 0, (2.9)
where E is the nominal exchange rate and H(-) is homogeneous of degree one.
Tfie consumers' price index increases when the price of domestic or foreign
goods increases. For example, a depreciation raises the price of imported goods
and thus the consumers' price index. The demand for capital follows from the
arbitrage condition
JK(K,N)-rtb-n,n-(P~P)`, (3.10)
which equates the marginal product of capita) to its user cost ( i.e. the rental
plus depreciation charges, minus expected capital gains). Finally, the real
exchange rate, y- P'E~P, follows from the interest parity condition
r-a-r'-n'i-(YIY)`. (2.11)
Equation (2.1 I) says that the arbitrage actions of risk-neutral specu)ators ensure
that the uncovered interest rate diflerential equals the expected rate ofexchange
depreciation. Forward integration yields
m
Y(t) - Y(oo)exp l - J {(r(s, t) - n(s, t)) -( r'(s, t) - n'(s, t))} ds~, (2.12)
where x(s, t) denotes the expectation of x(s) formed at time t, hence the real
exchange rate appreciates relative to its equilibrium value whenever the sum of
al) future expected real interest rate difíerentials in favour of the home country
is positive..
The complete two-country model can be described by 21 equations, that is
equations ( 2.1)-(2.1 I) and the foreign equivalents of equations (2.1)-(2.f0). It
corresponds to a two-country extension of previous models of closed economies
' Dornbusch and Fischer ( 1980) analyse the eBects of currenl-aocount dynamics in a small open
economy without capital accumulation.
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with Mundell-Tobin eflècts, which were constructed to demonstrate the non-
neutrality of anticipated demand-side policies (e.g. Fischer, 1979; Begg, 1980).
3. Loag-rua coaflict in interwtioaal objectives
Labour market equilibrium, Ns(wc) - KnD(wcH(1, y)), gives wc -~i(K, y),
~x - nnI(Ns - KnDH) 1 0, ~ir - KnówcHr~(NS - KnDH) c 0 so that em-
ployment is given by,
t t - t -
N- Ns(ti(K. Y)) - h(K, Y), h~ - Nsti~,l - K, Y (3.1)




where frr } fYNhY ~ 0 is assumed to hold for both countries.
Hence, an increase in the capital stock shifts out the labour demand schedule
and therefore increases the real wage, equilibrium employment and aggregate
supply. A depreciation of the real exchange rate increases the wedge between
the producers' wage and the consumers' wage, so that employment and
aggregate supply fall.
In the steady state, the real interest rates at home and abroad are equalised
and the respective inflation rates are solely determined by domestic monetary
growth rates. Hence, r- n- r' - n', a- p, a' - p' and y- 0. From (2.10)
and (2.11), it follows that in long-run equilibrium
Íx(K, h(K, Y)) - b- Ik.(K', h`(K', 1~Y)) - b' (33)
and therefore
t t
K" - ~(K, Y), WK -(fYY } fYNhK),(IK.1C. f fK.~y.Il~.) J U,
Wr -~lKNhr f J K'N'hr y2 ~~(J K.K. -~ fK.N.i1K.) ~ 0.
` ( 3.4 )
When the two economies are identical and have the same monetary growth
rates, (3.4) yields K' - K in long-run equilibrium.
3.1. Bonds ure nur ~iet w~ulth
Consider a world with perfect capital markets and infinitely-lived agents who
perceive that a change in the holdings of bonds will eventually have to be
matched by a future change in taxes of equal discounted value. In the absence
of intertemporal borrowing constraints, the impact of current disposable income
on consumption is negligible and can be ignored. When a- 0, wealth consists
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only of real money balances and capital, that is, V-(PK f M)~Pc. Hence, net
investment can be written as
K- F(K. Y) - C"(., Y. {K -f LCF(K. Y). ÍK(K. ti(K, Y)) ~- n - bJ}~H(t, Y))
- C"'~(.. Y. {K' f L'[F'(K', Y-'). IK.(K', h '(K', Y-'))
- - (-) ~ f
-~ n' - b')}~H'(1, y-')) - áK - 1(K, K', Y, rz, n'), (3.5)
where the partial derivatives ( evaluated at the steady state) are given by
IK-r-~l-Cy~(l i- LrFKi-Lr{ÍKR}ÍKNhK})H-~ fINhKC~,
~K. - - Cy.(Í ~ Ly.FK. f L~ lIK'K' f fK'N'ÍIK.})H~-1
~ O'
fr - Fr - C~ - CDCLrF~ f ~-.ÍKNh, - VH,]H-
~ - C~w' f C~r:[LY Fr
f L`IK'N'h' - V~H~]Hr-~IYi2 (GO),r' r
Ix - - CoL,N-' ~ 0
and
IR. - - CM:L. H.- ~ ~ 0.
The life-cycle hypothesis gives C~ z r- p, so that IK ~ 0 as long as labour
supply is not too elastic. Hence, the increase in output, caused by an increase
in home capital, is outweighed by the increase in home consumption (due to
higher wealth) and the increase in wear and tear, thus resulting in a reduction
in net investment. Similarly, an increase in foreign capital boosts foreign wealth
and therefore there is an increase in home exports and a corresponding fall in
net home investment. A depreciation of the real exchange rate has four eflects.
Thc first is an increase in the home real consumers' price index, which causes
a fall in home real wealth and thus a fall in home consumption and an increase
in home investment. The second eflect is a fall in the foreign real consumers'
prices index, which causes an increase in foreign wealth and thus an increase
in home exports and fall in home investment. The third efïect is to increase the
volume of home consumption and exports and thus to reduce net investment.
The fourth efTect is to incrcase the wedge between the producers' and
consumers' wage, so that aggregate supply falls and therefore savings and net
investment fall. The first and second efïects cancxl out in symmetric economies
with C~ - C~:, so that 1, ~ 0. An increase in the home inflation rate increases
the home nominal interest rate, so that agents economise on holdings of moncy
balances, wealth and consumption fall, and thus net investment increases. An
increase in the forcign inflation rate increases the foreign nominal interest rate,
which reduces foreign wealth and home exports and thus increases net home
investment.
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Inflation is in the short run determined by (2.5), (2.10) and (3.2),






1,r - - (L,Fxil-.) - irY - i~ICNhY ~ ~~
II,,-L;' ~0,
(3.6 )
nr - - (LrFr~j-.) - ixNhr j 0.
The partial derivative I1K has been evaluated on the assumption that labour
supply is not too elastic (small ht, h,). A higher stock of money requires a lower
interest rate and inflation rate in order to induce agents to willingly hold it.
A higher capital stock increases income, reduces the real interest rate, and
therefore increase money demand, which is choked otí by higher inflation. A
depreciation of the real exchange rate cuts income and reduces the real interest
rate, so that the short-run eflect on inflation is ambiguous. Obviously, inflation
is in the long run determined by the monetary growth rate (n - N).




1[K, ~(K, Y). Y, Ir. N'] - 0 (3.7)
-tf -(-)t f
~`[Il~(K,Y),K, l~Y, N`, N] - 0. (3.8)
Figure 1 represents equations ( 3.7) and ( 3.8) as the zero-savings loci describing
equilibrium in the home goods market ( GME) and foreign goods market
(GME'), respectively. The GME-locus slopes downwards, because the excess
demand for home goods, induced by an increase in capital at home and abroad,
is choked ofi by a fall in net exports and increase in aggregate supply, induced
by an appreciation of the real exchange rate ( and cut in the wedge between the
producers' and consumers' wage). An increase in home ( foreign) monetary
growth increases inflation and reduces holdings of real money balances, wealth
and consumption ( exports). A real depreciation eliminates the incipient excess
supply of goods, so that the GME-locus shifts upwards. Equilibrium at home
and abroad yields
t -~- t t -f- t
K- R(N, N'), N - a(N, N`), Y- p (N, N`) (3.9)






















If the two economies are identical, the home and foreign monetary growth rates
will be the same whether policies are coordinated or determined competitively
(in Nash equilibrium) and therefore K- K' and y- 1. It is clear that an
increase in the home monetary growth rate leads to the same increase in home
inflation, a reduction in the world real interest rate and therefore to an increase
in both the home and foreign levels of capital, output and employment. This is
the interdependent analogue of the Mundell-Tobin eflect and explains that
monetary expansion is a"locomotive" policy in the long run. In fact, foreign
inflation is unatíected and therefore each country has an incentive to transfer
the burden of reducing the world real interest rate to the other country.
3.2. lmperfect capital markets and selfrshness
Now consider the situation where BarraRicardo debt neutrality does not
hold and where there are liquidity constraints, hence a- l and home consump-
tion and cxports of home goods depend to a ot;rtain extent on home and foreign
disposable income, respectively. Manipulation of the government budget
constraint, ( 2.6), and ( 2.7) yields long-run real wealth:'
V - [PK f (r~(r - ~rt))M]~Pc. (3.11)
s In the long run tif~M 3 B~B - N so that (2.6) gives B~M - rp~(r - p~ Substitution into (2.7)
givcs ( 3.1 I ).
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An increase in inflation acts as a tax and therefore allows the servicing
of a
larger interest-bearing government debt, which boosts the real value of private
sector wealth. Upon substitution of (2.5), (2.9), (2.10) and (3.2) into (3.11), one
obtains the financial component of long-run real wealth:
V-(PKIPc) - LCF(K, Y)IH(1, Y). Ic f p- b](fr f N - b)I(Ix - b)
f -?
- Vf(K, Y, N). VF, - CrL, t(MIPc~I(r - u) ~ 0-
(3.12)
An increase in the monetary growth rate increases long-run inflation, which
increases the nominal interest rate and reduces the holdings of money balances.
However, it also increases the revenue from the tntiation tax ' and allows the
servicing of a larger interest-bearing government1debt. The net efTect of inflation
on financial wealth is therefore ambiguous. Note that, with full debt neutrality
(see Section 3.1), inHation unambiguously decrcases financial wealth in the long
run.
Upon substitution of (2.9), ( 3.2), (3.12) and BIPc - pVF into (2.1), one
obtains thc long-run expression:
IC - F(K, y) - bK - CD(F(K, y)IH(1, y) t pVF(K, y, N), y, KH(1, y)-'
f VF(K, Y, l~)7 - CM'[F'(K', Y-')IH'(1, 1IY)
t p'Vf~(K'. 1~Y. N`), Y, K'N`(1, 1IY)-' f VF~(K`, IIY, l~')~
(-) - (-) ? ?
- I( K, K`. Y. l~.l~`) - 0. (3.13)
One of the difierences with Section 3.1 is that real income and interest payments
now play a role in the consumption and export functions. This tends to
accentuate the negative efíects of an increase in home or foreign capital and a
real depreciation on net investment. The main point is, however, that the
long-run efTects of the monetary growth rates on net investment are no longer
unambiguous (as they were in (3.5)):
I„ -- C,o.(VF t pV,F,) - C~V;, ~ 0
and
M, - N. M.I - Cy.(Vf~ f {~'VF~) - Cy.VF~ ~ 0.
For example, if V M ~ 0 and V M: ~ 0, then 1„ ~ 0 and I,,. ~ 0 and therefore
K„ ~ 0 and RN. ~ 0. It is therefore possible that, if the eflects of the "inflation
tax" on publíc sector debt are large enough, an increase in the monetary growth
rate reduces both the home and foreign levels of capital, output and employ-
ment. In that case, monetary expansion is a"beggar-thy-neighbour" policy,
but more importantly the long-run conflict between inflation and output or
employment has disappeared. From a practical point of view, it seems unlikely
that there is no conflict between inflation and activity. Nevertheless, the
relaxation ofdebt neutrality dces seem to improve the long-run inflation-output
tradc-off.
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4. A linearized disequilibrium system of interdependent economies
It has been shown in Section 3 that a higher domestic monetary growth rate
typically leads in the long run to increases in capital, output and employment.
A linearized disequilibrium version of this result for symmetric interdependent
economies with C~ - C~ - r- n around p-{z' - 0 can be written as:`
k-- Qt k' - Qz(1 f 1') - Q3e, k(~) - ko, (4.1)




é- Q,(k' - k) - Qee, e(U) - free. (4.5)
where e - log(y), k and ! - log(L) - log(M~P) are expressed as the logarithmic
deviations from the steady-state levels associated with zero inflation (p -
N'-~),Qt -Cv ~~,Qz-CML~K'~~,Q~--(Fy-Co-CM~)Y~K]0,
Qs-KT1K~l), Qs- -LTI~~O, Qe-Ynrcfl, Q~- -K(ÍK~r}JKNhK)1O
and (fe - - 2yJKNhy ~ 0. The steady state is givcn by n - p, n' - ~', e- 0,
k- k' --~(Qz~A)(N f P') and 1 - C(Qt f~Q:Qs~Qs)u -(QzQa~Qs)N'~~0,
where 0- - Q,Qs - QzQ4 ~ 0. The normalisation Qz -- 20 is employed, so
that in steady state k- k' - p f p'. Hence, in the steady state inflation is
entirely a monetary phenomena, purchasing power parity holds and activity
(the real interest rate) is, via the interdependent Mundell-Tobin efíect, an
increasing (decreasing) function of monetary growth at home and abroad. The
steady-state level of real money balances decreases when home monetary
growth increases and when foreign monetary growth decreases. lt can be
shown that, when 2Q~Q~ ~ Q, Qs, the ]acobian of the system (4.1)-(4.5) satisfies
the saddlepoint property, that is, it has two stable eigenvalues associated with
the backward-looking ( predetermined) variables, k and k', and three unstable
eigenvalues associated with the forward-looking (jump) variables, 1, 1' and e.
In fact, given that the two economies have an ídentical structure, it is possible
to give a complete diagrammatic analysis in terms of global averages and
diflerences (cf., Aoki, 1981). If average activity and average liquidity in the world
economy are given by k' -~(k i- k') and 1' -}(l f f'), one obtains the
independent sub-system:
(~' ) - `- Qa - QsI `~oI } `~I(p
f ft'). (4.6)
`Equations ( 4.1)-(4.2) follow from log-linearising !~ a F(K,Y)- Co(.,r,(K t L)H-')-
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k-k'-k"
Ftc. 2. Unanticipated increase in monetary growth in interdependent economies.
Similarly, if k" - k- k', one obtains the independent sub-system:
C~I ~ - `- ~~ - ~~3)(eI ).
(4.7 )
The determinants of the Jacobians of (4.6). A c 0, and of (4.7), ~3,~8 -
2Q~Q, ~ 0(for not too elastic labour supply), are both negative, so that the
equilibria of the two sub-systems are saddlepoints.s This corresponds to the
forward-looking behaviour of I", 1' and e and to the backward-looking
behaviour of k" and k'.
Since there are no shocks that give rise to relative demand shifts, (4.7) shows
that k" - e- 0 must hold all the time. It follows that k- k' - k", 1- 1" t 21~,
1~-1"-~1',n-~tak-~islandn~-~ok-~sl',wherek,!"andta-l-1'
follow from the dynamics of (4.6) and
~J - N' t ~s1J, l~l~) - frce. (4.8)
Note that ther~ is no cxchunge rate overshooting, because the goods and labour
markets are assumed to clear instantaneously.
Figure 2 shuws what happens if there is an unanticipated permanent incrcase
in either the home or foreign monetary growth or in both. On impact global
sThe eigrnvalucs of the system (4.1)-(4.5) and of the systems (4.6). (4.7) anJ I' - p' -(f.k'
t~sl' t 2a~r are exactly thc same.
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rcal liquidity jumps discretely downwards, overshooting its new equilibrium
value, and afterwards gradually rises along the stable arm to the new
equilibrium F.'. Employment, output and capital (i.e. activity) do not change
on impact, but afterwards gradually incrcase as the real interest rate falls.b On
impact, the ditíerence in real liquidities, 1', jumps immediately to (p' -{~)~Qs.
Flence, a common increase in the monetary growth rates leads on impact to an
upward jump in the common inflation rate which overshoots the higher
equilibrium level. Also, an increase in the home monetary growth rate reduces
home liquidity and increases foreign liquidity and therefore increases home
inflation and reduces foreign inflation. The dynamic consequences of anticipated
or temporary changes in the monetary growth rates can also be analysed in
terms of averages and ditïerences.
5. Gains from macroeconomic policy coordination: a long-run perspective
This section compares various cooperative and competitive outcomes. The
welfare loss function of each government is quadratic and depends positively
on activity and negatively on inflation:'
~
Min W- f[9(k - k~Z f n2] exp( - pt)dt, 9~ 0, rc ~ 0 (5.1)
M J
0
where fc and zero are the desired valucs for the two objectives of economic
policy and p is the rate of time preference. The long-run conflict manifests itself
in the target (or full-employment) level of the capital stock being inconsistent
with no inflation. Nole that the qualitative conclusions of the analysis are
unaffected when the government also cares about the level of national income
and~or employment, as both of thesc are positively correlated with output. The
individual governments minimise (5.1) subject to the system (4.1)-(4.5).
Discounting is introduced to ensure that the welfare loss function converges,
but to keep matters simple results are presented for the case where the discount
rate is arbitrarily small. This does not aflect the qualitative nature of the results.
Section 5.1 considers the steady state of various cooperative and competitive
diflerential-game outcomes when each government can pre-commit itself to its
announcements about present and future monetary policies. The Appendix
shows that, when p-~ 0, those steady-state outcomes with pre-commitment
can also be obtained from minimising the asymptotic welfare loss function,
0(k - k~2 f p~ for the home government and B(k' - c~2 f u'2 for the foreign
government, subject to the steady-state constraint, k- k' - p f p'. The
Appendix also considers the disequilibrium features of the optimal strategies.
Section 5.2 uses differential game theory to analyse the intertemporal trade-offs
óThe speed at which activity mova towards the new equilibrium is given by }(Rs -~~) -
f IBs - 6~)' - e.
' The eBects of a morc general welfarc loss function, which depends on aggrcgate consumption
and therefore on income ( capitali, liquidity and monetary growth, is discussed in Section 5.2.
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and demonstrates that the non-cooperative outcomes of Section 5.1 are time
inconsistent. Section 5.2 also discusses credible solution concepts for competi-
tive decision making in interdependeat dynamic economies with perfect
foresight.
5.1. Asymptotic cooperatiue an~J competitiue outcomes under pre-commitment
In the Nash equilibrium each country takes the poticies of the other country
as given, which yields the asymptotic reaction curve
it - B(Tc - p`)~(1 t 6). (5.2)
When the rival country increases its monetary growth rate, home output
increases yet home inflation is unafïected. This diminishes the marginal welfare
of income, so that the home government shifts its attention towards the in8ation
target and thus reduces its monetary growth rate. The intersection of the home
and foreign reaction curve yields, for the case fc - Á-C', the asymptotic symmetric
Nash equilibrium solution: '
l~ - N` - Nrv - 9k~(1 t 2U). (5.3)
Obviously, when the priority attached to improving capital, output or employ-
ment ( U) increases, the governments end up with higher inflation rates.
An alternative solution concept for competitive policy tormulation is the
Stackelberg equilibrium solution. If the foreign country is the leader, it
minimises its welfare loss funetion subject to the follower's reaction curve, (5.2).
This yields the leader's asymptotíc monetary growth rate,
p' -~; - U~C~(1 t 3U t B2) ~ {~N, (5.4)
and the follower's asymptotic monetary growth rate,
N-{~,-U(1fU)~C~(1-4-3UtU2)~I~N~yr;. (5.5)
The leader has managed to transfer some of the burden of lowering the world
real interest rate to the follower, which makes the leader better otï and the
follower worse ofT than in the Nash equilibrium solution.e Note that both
countries also end up with lower levels of capital, output and employment than
in the Nash equilibrium solution.
When the two countries coordinate their monetary policies, they might
minimize the global welfare loss:




' The fullower is worse uff, because it ends up with higher innation and luwer output,
k- k' z FO(2 t U)~(1 t 3U t U1) ~ 2N, lhan in the Nash case.
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which, in the absence of asymmetric preferences, yields the Nash bargaining
solution. This yields the asymptotic cooperative monetary growth rates,
N-N`-Nc-28k~(It4B)~N:~NN~N;. (5.7)
so that coordination leads to a joint expansion of monetary growth rates. The
reason for this is that with cooperation there is no longer an incentive to transfer
the burden of bearing high inflation to the rival country. The steady-state level
of activity under coordination ( k - k' - kc) exceeds the level of activity under
Nash-competition ( k - k' - kN), which exceeds the level of activity under
Stackelberg-competition ( k - k' - k, - N, t N;): kc ~ kN ~ k,. The coopera-
tive outcome is not sustainable without some form ot commitment, since each
country has an incentive to deviate. If the home country cheats, it chooses to
reduce its monetary growth.
N; c N- Nn - 9(1 t 29)~c~(1 f 49)(1 f 9) c NN, (5.8)
iriorder to reap the benefits of a relatively low world real rate of interest without
sufiering from high inflation. The various cooperative and competitive outcomes
are portrayed in Figure 3.
It can be shown that the percentage reduction in welfare loss obtained from
international policy coordination is 100 B~[(1 - }. B)(1 -}- 46)], which corres-
ponds to 7.4 "Io, 10 "~o, 11.1 "~o and 10 "~o for B- 2, 1, ~ and ~. These are
substantial gains from coordination, since they last forever. The corresponding
gains in previous studies are zero (e.g., Currie and Levine, 1985; Miller and
Salmon, 1985; Oudiz and Sachs, 1985; Rogofl, 1985), since these studies only
considered transient trade-ofl's.
If, however, one country ( say, the foreign country) were interested in a
relatively higher level of national activity (k' ~ k~, one obtains
N-N`-Nc-e(~t~C')~(1f4B) (5.9)
under coordination or
N- Nn - BC~C t B(rc - l-c')]~(1 ~- 2B) (5.10)
and
N`-NN-e[~C't8(~`-~7~(1f20)~N,v (5.11)
under competitive (Nash) policy formulation. The foreign country engages in
a more inflationary strategy, since it cares more for a higher level of activity.
The home country benefits from the reduction in the world real interest rate
and can therefore afíord to pursue a less inflationary strategy.
5.2. CreJibility and coordination
The problem with decentralised international policy formulation with pre-
commitment, as discussed in Section 5.1, is that it is time inconsistent, since
each government has an incentive to revise and re-optimise its announced
optimal monetary policies after some time. This time inconsistency refers to the
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lte
FtG. 3. Cooperative and competitive monetary poticia under pre-commitment.
Key: R-Reaction curve of home country
N-Nash equilibrium
S-Stackelberg equilibrium (if the home eountry follo~vs)
E -Eft'icient outcoma
C-Cooperative (Nash bargaining) outcome
D-Devistion of the home country from the coopeative outcome
L -"Loss of leadership" solution
fact that it pays a government or Central Bank to renege on the promise it has
made about its futurc monetary policies to the private sectors. It should be
distinguished from when a government deviates from a cooperative agreement
and cheats on a rival government. The time inconsistency also holds at the steady
state of the pre-commitment non-cooperative outcomes, so that these outcomes
are, in the absence of "binding contracts" or reputational forces, unattainable
or not credible. This can be seen from the fact that the shadow prices of the
forward-looking expectations variables, I' and l~,' are uro at the beginning of
the planning period, as they are unconstrained by their past history at time
zero and therefore their marginal contribution to economic welfare should be
uro at that point of time, but they ditTer from uro after time zero (see
Appendix). T'he intuition behind the time inconsistency of optimal monetary
policy is that each government has an incentive to levy a"surprise" inflation
' For the Stackelberg outoome with prc-0ommitmrn4 the home eountry's shadow~priae of activity
is also a forward-looking varisble as far as the foreign couniry is concsroed (aee Appendix).
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tax and thereby erode the real value of money balances (cL, Calvo, 1978). The
time inconsistency of the non-cooperative outcomes with pre-commítment
raises welfare by a sufficient amount to ensure that all multilateral incentives
to renege with a"surprise" inflation tax are eliminated (see Appendix), which
can be seen from the fact that the shadowprices of the forward-looking variables,
1" and 1', are always zero for this case. However, there is, of course,
the usual unilateral incxntive to deviate from the cooperative outcome
(see equation (5.8)).
When neither government can pre-commit itselt to its announced optimal
monetary growth rates, time-consistent non-cooperative outcomes are relevant.
Both the "loss of leadership" solution proposed by Buiter (1983) and the
dynamic programming solution proposed by Cohen and Michel (1984)'o treat
the forward-looking variables, 1' and l', as predetermined at the time of
optimisation and, as the Appendix shows, lead to an infinite number of
solutions. However, if the monetary growth rate enters the welfare loss function
directly or indirectly, this indeterminacy can be resolved. For example, if each
government wants to increase aggregate consumption and decrease inftation,
the welfare loss criterion becomes, instead of (5.1):
~




wherc c denotes the desired value of aggregate consumption. The long-run
conflict now manifests itself in the target level of aggregate consumption being
inconsistent with no inflation. Consumption of home and foreign goods
increases with wealth, so that it increases with capital (k) and holdings of real
money balances (1). Consumption typically also depends on dísposable income,
so that it increases with production income (proxied by k) and, to the extent
that public sector deficits~are not financed by consols, the discounted stream of
future inflation taxes diminishes (see equation (2.8)) and thus consumption
increases with the monetary growth rate (pL). It is a straightforward exercise
to show that, when c- c', the steady-state values of the monetary growth rates
under international policy coordination with pre-commitment are
{~-N'-Nc-1r788e, Ba-2Ht-~~2~2Q`~S 1~f0~ (5.13)
and under decentralised formulation of national pol`icies with pre-commitment
are
N- Ni -~N - I OQ~iy~y
G~1~, ~ G f7S - f7t f 02~~4~3 1 t f B~ G B`.
I (5.14)
'ol'he dynamic prugrrmming solution assumes that f' and 1~ are a linear function of the
prcdetermined vanable, k', as given by the stable manifold.
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The steady-values of consumption are given by B~{~c and B~pN, respectively.
Note that, when 6, - 1, Uz - 93 - 0 and c- y, then 9~ - 2, BS - 1 and thus
(5.13) and (5.14) reduce to (S.7) and (5.3). It is also clear that competitive policy
formulation with pre-commitment leads to inefficiently low levels of monetary
growth and activity. Coordination with pre-commitment is, for 9~ ~ 0, now
time inconsistent, since the marginal value of global liquidity to the world planner
is strictly negative and therefore there is an íncentive to renege and impose a
"surprise" inflation tax (see Appendix). Decentralised policy formulation is,
as before, time inconsistent.
Now consider the credible outcomes. The "loss of leadership" solution
recognises that the governments are unable to influence the expectations of the
private sectors and therefore treats the forward-looking variables, l' and 1~, as
predetermined. It follows that the "loss of leadership" solution for both the
cooperative and non-cooperative outcome lead to the following monetary
growth rates (see Appendix):
~-I4~-J~r.-~~ea~Itc~NH. (S.1S)
Since the governments have lost their ability to make credible announcements
about future monetary policy, the governments perceive that they cannot
influence the inflation rates and therefore pursue a policy of exactly achieving
the desired level of aggregate consumption. It follows that international
cooperation is futile as the welfare loss is exactly the same as under the com-
pctitive (Nash and Stackelberg) outcomes, that is W- W' - WL - c~~9;.' `
There simply is no point in international policy coordination, because neither
country has credibility and therefore each country is forced to set the level of
activity to its desired level.
The asymptotic welfarc loss under policy coordination with pre-commitment
is given by
W-W'-Wc-Bé~~(l f9B~)cWi, (5.16)
so that the world planner can obviously improve global welfare when it can
establish binding contracts or a reputation tor not reneging with the private
sectors. The welfare loss of competitive ( Nash) policy formulation with
pre-commitment is given by
W- W' - Wx a e(I f 6B,)c~~(I f 96~6s)' (S.I7)
which is less than Wi if 1 f BB~(~s9s - 9i)~~s ~ 0 holds.
It may be that the foreign country cannot pre-commit and is therefore foroed
to use credible policies, p' - p~. If the home government can pre-commit then
the steady-state outcome under decentralized policy formulation is given by
~-~N~ - eBs~~[e.(1 f ee,)] ~ aN. (S.la)
" Strictly speakinó, the welfare lossa for the ax that p~ 0 do not converóe and thereforc
cannot lx evaluated. Hence, the welfarc loasa given arc asymptotic averasa over time.
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Since the foreign government is forced to have an excessive monetary growth
rate, it carries most of the burden of reducing the world real interest rate.
It follows that the home country can reap the benefits in terms of higher
activity and therefore engage in a less inflationary policy. Note that, if
1 t BB.(~,9j - B2)~~, ~ 0, the foreign government has no incentive to build
a reputation with its private sector, but that the home government has an
unambiguous incentive to pre-commit itself ( as W- WNC - ~I~NCIe. ~ Wi)-
6. Coocludiae remarks
The main objective of this paper was to investigate the case for coordination
in the presence of a genuine long-run output-in8ation trade-ofi when govern-
ments are able to pre-commit to their announced optimal policies. In a classical
stock-flow model of interdependent economies, higher rates ofmonetary growth
boost economic activity at home and abroad due to a two-country version of
the Mundell-Tobin efïect. Non-neutrality of government debt and liquidity
constraints weaken the long-run output-inflation trade-ofl, since a higher rate
of monetary growth means more revenues from the "inflation tax", permits the
servicing of a higher government debt and therefore the associated increase in
private sector wealth increases consumption and leads to some crowding out
of private sector investment. Since each country wishes to transfer the burden
of higher inflation and the job of lowering the world real interest rate to
the other country, competitive policies ( whether in Nash or in Stackelberg
equilibrium with pre-commitment uis-à-uis the private section) lead to two low
inflation rates and to too low levels of capital, output and employment.
Coordination leads to a lower world real interest rate and higher activity, but
each country has an incentive to deviate by lowering its rate of monetary
growth. These results suggest an international stale-mate in reducing the world
real rate of interest.
However, if the governments are unable to pre-commit themselves due to the
absence of binding contracts of reputational forces, the above results no longer
hold. The problem is that the pre-commitment or "rules" outcomes are time
inconsistent, since each government has an incentive to renege and levy a
"surprise" inflation tax and thereby erode the real value of money balances
accumulated by the private sector. The consistent or '.'discretionary" ("loss of
leadership") outcomes lead to excessive monetary growth rates, since neither
government is able to manipulate the inflation rate and therefore they attempt
to achieve the desired level of real activity exactly. It therefore dces not matter
whether governments coordinate or engage in compctitive policy formulation
and in buth cases welfare is worse than under international policy coordination
with pre-commitment. Hence, international policy coordination without pre-
commitment yields the same welfare as competitive policy formulation without
pre-commitment whilst pre-commitment without international cooperation
does not pay.
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Previous studies (e.g. Carlozzi and Taylor, 1985; Miller and Salmon, 1985;
Currie and Levine, 1985; Oudiz and Sachs, 1985) did not allow for a long-run
trade-ofí between output and inflation, hence the optimal plan is consistent
once the steady state is reached and dynamic inconsistency is therefore a
transient issue. However, when there is a long-run trade-oflbetween activity
and inflation, both the competitive and cooperative policies with pre-commit-
ment are time inconsistent, even once the steady state has been reached. Clearly,
time inconsistency is therefore a more persistent problem in models with
long-run trade-ofís. It should be pointed out that there may be a long-run role
for international policy coordination in natural-rate-models when there are
permanent shocks and both fiscal and policy instruments (e.g. Currie, Levine
and Vidalis, 1987). In such models international cooperation without pre-
commitment and pre-commitment without international cooperation do not
necessarily pay (also see Rogofl, 1985; Miller and Salmon, 1985; Oudiz and
Sachs, 1985; van der Ploeg, 1988). However, some argue that, when the game
between the two governments and the private sector is treated as a sequential
game, international policy coordination is a dominant and subgame-perfect
strategy of the two Centra) Banks and therefore non-cooperation without
pre-commitment is not a relevant outcome (Carraro and Giavaui, 1988).
Although it requires a considerable stretch of the imagination, it may be
useful to indulge in a brief empirical note. In the late sixties and early seventies
the trust and cooperation between governments and private sectors that
developed in the immediate post-war period broke down in most countries.
This meant that governments could no longer make credible announcements
about future monetary policy. The eventual result was the consistent solution
with excessive inflation rates and too high levels of activity relative to the
outcomes that would pertain under international policy coordination with
pre-commitment. In the late seventies and eighties governments began to build
a reputation for "sticking to their guns" (cL Backus and Driffill, 1985). This
meant that after some time pre-commitment outcomes became feasible. This
resulted in a non-cooperation trap of much too low monetary growth rates and
too low levels of real activity. [t is not clear whether welfare is now lower or
higher than in the early seventies, but it is clear that, now credibility has been
achieved, there are large welfare gains from international policy coordination.
The challenge is to persuade the major industrial countries to multilaterally
increase their monetary growth rates, reduce the world real interest rate,
increase world activity and increase welfare without damaging the reputations
with the private sectors.
There are at least four interesting directions of future research. The first is to
explore the issues discussed in this paper within the context of a model with
proper micro foundations. The main difficulty will be to spxify a satisfactory
theory of the demand for money, but at least an explicit welfare analysis will
bc possible. It will be necessary to allow for time-varying rates of time preference
and for finite horizons (Blanchard, 1985) in order to give a role for monetary
policy (Marini and van der Ploeg, 1988). Finite lives are required, because when
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agents are infinitely lived monetary policy is super-neutral (Sidrauski, 1967).
The second direction is to properly allow for current-account dynamics
(cf. Dornbusch and Fischer, 1980). The third is to relax the classical [eatures
of the model presented in this paper and to allow for Keynesian rigidities in
wage and price formation (e.g. Taylor, 1979, 1980). This means that the Ievels
of real liquidity become predetermined and are no longer [orward-looking,
so that there is an inflation-output trade-otí even under credible policy
formulation. In such a more general model, it is possible ihat, if governments
cannot pre-commit, coordination can exacerbate the "credibility constraints'
and therefore can be counter-productive and make both countries worse off
(cL RogofT, 1985). It is also possible to allow for internal adjustment costs in
investment decisions. This provides additional incentives to renege, for a
governmcnt might announce a high monetary growth rate in order to depress
the real interest rate and encourage investment. But once some capital has been
accumulated, the government chcats and implements a lower monetary growth ~
rate than promised. This reneging goes in the opposite direction of the levy of
a"surprise" inflation tax and can provide an additional reason why coordina-
tion might be counter-productive. The final direction is to extend the analysis
to a model of three of more interdependent economies (e.g. Canzoneri and
Henderson, 1986). I[ the two countries considered in this paper are the US and
Europe, it is implicitly assumed that the individual countries that make up
Europe cooperate and coordinate their policies. However, when the member
states of Europe engage in competitive policy formulation and there are
international externalities, the aggregate reaction curve of Europe difíers.
Cooperation within Europe may engender a deflationary response of the US,
which can conceivably make coordination of European policies counter-
productive.
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APPENDIX
Courdination
The cooperative strategies, when lhe governments can pre-commit Ihemselves to their announce-
ments about present and future policies, can be found from choosing P and N' to minimise W f W',
i.e. (S.6), subject to eyuations ( 4.6), (4.8), k- k' ~ k', a~ Q~k' - Qs(1' t}!~) and ac' - Q~k'
- Qs(N -}I'). lf the Hamiltonian is defined as
H - }~U(k' - ~C)j t 0(k' - k')s t {Qak' - Qs(1' t }la)}s t (Qsk' - Qs(I' - }l~)} ~
t.i,k' t,iI I' t~l s}'. ( A I)
unc ubla~ns tl„ -},ii t Às - 0, lIN. -}ÀS - .is - 0.
pd~-A~-fls.-Ulk'- c~tU(k'-fc')t U.{Q.k'-Qsll't}1')}
t )1.{Q.k~ - Qs(1' - }l~)} - Q~~~ - QaZ:. ~il~) - free (A2)
p.i: - ,is - tlr - - Qs{Q.k~ - Qsll' t }I')} - Qs{{l.k` - Qsll' - }!')}
- Q:À~ t QsZ:, 2:(0) - fi. (A3)
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and
vx, - ~, ~ Hr - - iBs{B.k' - BS(i' t }N)} t }Bs{Bak' - Bs(r - }f')}
f Bs~l,, x,(0) ~ 0 (A4)
as the first-order conditions. Since M and N are forward-looking variables and unconstrained by
their past history, their marginal contribution to welfare must be uro at the beginning of the
planning horizon and consequently ~t:(0) - dy(0) - 0(cC Calvo, 1978)- In fact, H, - Hp. ~ 0yields
,l:(t) z x,(t) - 0, Vt ~ 0. This implies that for cooperative sirategies there is no multilateral incentive
to re-optimix ( renege), so that policy coordination ia time consistent. (There is, of courx, a
unilateral incentive to deviale from the cooperative outcome). It follows from (A4) that 1'(r) - 0,
Vt ~ 0, so that 1 - 1' - 1'. (A3) gives a- ~c' - -}B,x~~Bs and (4.8) gives {[ - N'. Upon subslilution
of thex results and (4.6) into (A2j, one obtains, after some manipulation, the cloxd-loop
reprexntation of the optimal open-loop ( pre-commitment) policies for p- 0:
u- v' - Bak' - Bsf' }}(BsIB's)[(2Ba - 1)(Bak' - Bsl') - Bak.
- 0(k' - ~ - 0(k' - ~')l. (AS)
Substitution of (AS) into ( 4.6) yields the closed-loop system:
k' -- B~ k' - B:1', k'(01 - kó (Atí)
~' -}(B:IBs)L(2Ba - 1)(Bak' - Bsf') - Bak' - 0(k' - k~ - O(k' - fc')]. N(0) s frx.
(A7)
Thc Jacobian of the system (A6)-(A7) has one stabk and one unatabk eigenvalut,
t}(B:~Bs) t f 40, corresponding to the backward-looking variable, k', and the forward-looking
variable, I', respectively. The steady state of this system yields p a p' - sr a a' ~ 0(~C t fc')~
( I f 40) (xe (3.7) and (5.9)) and k~ k' ~ 2B(fc f k')~( I f 40). The movement along tht stable
manifold is given by
k(r) ~ k'(r) ~ exp( -,ir)k'(01 f[1 - exP(- ~lt)]20(fc t fi')~(1 f 40) (A8)
where the speed of adjustment, ,l aE }(B~~B s) 1 t 40, is an increasing function of the priority
attached to the output target.
If !he welfarc loss criterion is, instead of (3.1 ]. (3.12) and è s c', p s p' a~ is given by (3.13),
,ii(ao) - 200,é~( I t 00}) ~ 0 and ~l,(ao) ~ 0. If 0, ~ 0, there is a multilateral incentive to renege
as 12(ao) ~ 0. Henoe, with welfare loss functions that depend on the monelary growth rate, policy
coordination with pre-commitment is time inconsistent. The "loss of kadership" solution
(Buiter, 1983) xts xr z~l, - 0, dt ~ 0 and thereforc 0~ y t Ojf t O,v ~ 0~ y' t Osl' f O,v' - é,
V[ 3 0. Hence, in the steady state, N s{~' a N~ ~ è~0a.
Competitint Nash equilibrium
The oplimal policies with prc-commitrnent of the home country, given the optimal policies of
the foreign country, may be found from choosing N to minimize W, i.e. (3.1), subject to (4.6) and
(4.8). One obtains H, -}v, f r, z 0,
pr~ - Y~ ~ H4' a 0(k' -~ f Bs { Bak' - Bs(1' .F }la) }- Bi r~
- Bsr:, v~(0) a fret, (A9)
vvi - v: ~ Hr -- Bs{Bak' - Bs(I' t}N)} - Brri f Bsvl, ri(0) ~ 0 (A10)
and
vv,-k,SHr--}Bs{Bak'-Bs(Pf}N)}fB,r„ r,(0)~0, (All)
wherc the home country's Hamiltonian is defined as
H~}0(k'-k~'t}{Bak'-BS(Nt}N)}sfr~lt'fr2Nfr,N. (A12)
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Similarly, for the foreign country one obtains ~v2 - v~ - 0,
pv~ - ~~ - U(k' - ~') t ila{(p.k' - ~s(r - ~l')} - ~~vi
- ~~vi, v~(0) a free, (A13)
pvi - ~i - - ~s{~.k' - ~slf' - }N)} - ~ivi t ~svi. vil0) - 0 (A14)
and
pvi - vi - ~Qs{~.k' - Qsll' - ~1')} t ~svi. vi(0) - 0. (Al5)
Since there are 5 predetermined variables, i.e. k', v,, v~, vi and v~, and 4 jump variables, i.e. 1', 1~,
v, and v~ , the transient dynamics takes place on a S-dimensional stable manifokl. The steady state
of this system for p- 0 satisfies from (4.6)-(4.8) k' a N t p', ac s N and a' ~ p', from (A9)-(A I 1),
N- 0(k-- N')~(1 t B), and from (A13)-(A1S), p' ~ B(FC' - N)~(l t B} Intersection of these
asymptolic reaction curves, i.e. ( S.2), yields the steady-state Nash equilibrium with pre-commitmeot,
( 5.3) or ( 5.10)-( S.I l). The associated steady-state values of the co-states arc v, -- 2~sNNlai ~ 0.
v, -- 2v, ~- NN ~ 0, vi ~- 2asNNI~s ~ 0 and vi z 2v3 ~- NM ~ 0. Unless there are no
distortions in the economies (E ~ E' a 0), each governrttent has an incentive to re-optimise (renege)
and re-set the co-states of the forward-looking variables to uro as after time uro v, ~ 0, vs ~ 0,
v~ ~ 0 and v~ L 0. This problem of time inconsistcncy means that the Nash equilibrium with
pre-commitment is, in the absenoe of explicit or implicit binding contracts, not credible. The "loss
of leadership" solution to the problem of timo inconsistency (Buiter, 1983) treats the forward-
looking variables as given, so Ihat v,(t) : vs(t) ~ vi(t) 3 v;(t) a v;(r) ~ 0, dt 3 0 and equalions
(A10). (AI I), (Al4) and (AIS) are ignored. It is immediatcly clear from (4.6), (4.8). (A9) and (Al3)
that there are an infinite number of "loss of leadership" solutions (even if p a 0). Because the
backward-looking Iaws of motion are independent of economic policy, the same indeterminacy
occurs for the time-consistent solution proposed by Cohen and Michel (1984).
If the welfare loss criterion is (S.12) rather than (S.1), the pre-commitment outcomes are given
by (S.14), vi(~)~v](~)--~NN-B(0)-}Bs~s~)(c-B.NN)~0 and vs(~)~-vi(~)-
}pN t jUO,~~ ~(é - O~NN) ~ 0 and are therefore time inconsistent. The "loss of leadership"
solution sets v, ~ vs - vi - v~ - 0, Vt 3 0 and therefore O,k t B,f t 9sN - O,k' t 0,1' t Osp'
- c, Vt 3 0. The steady-state outcome is therefore N z p' ~ pc ~ c~B~.
Cumpetitiur Stuckelbery rquilibrium
Thc optimal policies with pre-commitment of the Stackelberg leader may be found from choosing
the time-trajectory for N' to minimise W' subject to (4.6). (4.8), v, -- 2v~, (A9), (A!0) and (Al l).
(AI I) can be replaced by 2~sn t~,v, - 0. Hence, if lhe leader's Hamiltonian is defined as
tf' -~Olk' - fc)s t }{~ak' - Qs(1' -}1s)}j t w,k' t w,Í' t wsÍ'
t cu~'v, t c,is'v, t ws[2~s{~ak' -~s(1' t{I')} -~ ~,v,] (A16)
one obtains fIM. - jui, - w~ - 0,
pcu~ -iu, -H,f~-O(k'-fc)t~.{~.k'-~s(1'-~I')} - {f,a, -ll.~:
-(0 t lt:)w. t~.PsWS t 2~i~e. m~(0) - free. (A17)
p~ili - ~: - H f - - ~s{~.k' - ~slr - ~f~)} - 8:~~ t ~s~: t ~.Qs~.
- I's~~ - 2pw,b. v,,lo) - o. (Ala)
V~~ - w~ - H~ - ~as{esk' - ifs(1' - ~l.)} t asw~ t ~v.ÍfsW. - ~if;~s
- ~.~s~s. ~i10) s 0, (A19)
p~. - tus - H :, -~~~. t r4:~s t~z~s. ~.10) z 0 (A20)
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and
lxos - ws - If.', -~a~~ - Rsms. ms(0) ~ frce. (A21)
Thc transicnt dynamics takes place on a 4-dimensional atabk manifold associated with the
predetermined variables k„ vi( -- vs), roi( - ms) and cu.. The steady state of Ihis systcm can tx
shown to give k- k' - k„ p - p, and p' - N; when p y 0. The pre-commitment outcomes are
time inconsistent, since v~, vs, cui, ce~ and w. are non-uro after some time has elapsed.
REFERENCES
A17.ENMAN, J. and FRENKf.L, J. A. (1985). "Optimal wage indexation, foreign exchange intervention
and monetary policy". American Economic Review, 75, pp. 402-23.
AoKt, M. (1981). Dynamíc Anafysis oj Open Economies. Academic Press, New York.
BACtcus, D. and DRtFEtLL, J. (1985). "Inflation and repulalion". American Economic Review, 75,
pp. 530-8.
BARRO, R. J. ( I974). "Are government bonds net wealth?". lournal oj Poliricof Economy, 82,
PP- 1095-117.
BEGG, D. K. H. (1980). "Rational expectations and the non-neutrality of systematic monetary
policy". Review oj Economic Studies, 47, pp. 293-303.
BLANCHARD, O. (1985). "Debts, deficits and finite horizons". Journal oj Politicol Economy, 93,
PP- 223-47.
BUITER, W. H. (1981). "The superiority of contingent rules over fixed rules in models with rational
expectations". Economic Journal,91, pp. 647-70.
BUITER, W. H. (1983). "Optimal and time-consistent policies in continuous time rational
expectations models". LSE Econometrics Programme, I,ondon, Discussion Paper no. A39.
BUITER, W. H. and EATON, J. (1985). "Poliry deantralizalion and exchange rate managemtnt in
interdependent economies", in J. S. Bhandari (ed.), Exchonge Rate Mnnagement under
Uncertainry. MIT Press.
CALVO, G. A. (1978). "On the time consistency of optimal policy in a monetary economy".
Econometrica, 46, pp. 1411-28.
CANZONERI, M. B. and HENDERSON, D. W. (1986). "Three countries and coalilions". Chapter il
of Srrategic Aspects oj Macroeconomic Policy Making tn Interdependent Economfes, mimeo.
CARLOZZI, N. and TAVt.oR, 1. B. (1985). "International capital mobility and lhe ooordination of
monetary rules", in J. S. Bhandari (ed.), ExnAange Rate Mannpement under Uncertainty. MIT
Press.
CARRARO, C. and GtAVAZZt, F. (1988). "Can internatbnal policy ooordination really be counter-
productive?", Cenlre for Economic Policy Research, London, Discuasion Paper no. 258.
COHEN, D. and MICHEL, P. (1984). "How should control theory be used to cslculate a
time-consistent government policyT". Rtview Oj Eeonomic Studies, 55, pp. 263-74.
CUaatE, D. A. and LEVINE, P. L. (1985). "Macroeconomic policy design in an interdependent
world", in W. H. Buiter and R. C. Marston (eds.J. International Economic Policy Coordination.
CUP, Cambridge.
CURRIE, D., LEVINE, P. and VtDAt.rs, N. (1987]. "[nternational cooperation and rcputation in an
empirical two-bloc model", in R. C. Bryant and R. Portes (eds.), Globaf Macroeconomics:
Policy ConJlict and Cooperarfon, MacMillan, London.
DORNBUSCH, R. and FtscHER, S. (1980). "Exchange rates and the currcnt accounl". American
Economic Review, 70, 5, pp. 960-71.
FISCHER, S. (1979). "Anticipations and the non-neulrality of money". Journaloj Pofitica! Economy,
87, 2, PP. 225-52.
FISCHER, S. and MODIGLIAM, F. (1978). "Towarda an understanding of the costa of inflation".
Weltwirtschajtliches Archiv, IV, pp. 810-37.
GALE, D. (1983). Money: In Disequilibriam. James Nisbet and CUP, Cambridgt.
F. VAN DER PLOEG 525
MARINI, G. and VAN DER PLOE(;, F. (1988). " Monetary and fiscal policy in an optimizing model
with capital accumulation and finite lives". Economic Journal, 98, 392, pp. 772-86.
MILLER, M. H. and SALMON, M. (1985). "Policy coordination and dynamic gamcs", in W. H.
Buiter and R. C. Marstun ( eds.), Internoriunaf Economic Policy Coordination, CUP, Cambridge.
OuDtz, G. and SACHS, 1. (1985). " International policy coordination in dynamic macroeconomic
modds", in W. H. Buiter and R. C. Marston ( eds.). Internariunal Economic Policy Coordination.
CUP, Cambridge.
PLOt:c, F. vAN DER (1988). "International policy coordination in interdependent monetary
economies". Juurnal uj Inrernational Econumics, 25, 1~2, pp. 1-23.
RocoFF, K. (1985). "Can international monetary policy cooperation be counterproductive?".
Journal uj Intrrnatiunal Economics, I8, pp. 199-217.
SIDRAUSKI, M. (1967). "Rational choice and patterns of growth in a monetary economy". American
Ecunumic Revirw, 62, pp. 534-44.
TAYLOR, 1. B. (1979). "Staggered wage setling in a macroeconomic model". Americon Economic
Rruiew, 69, pp. 108-13.
TAYLOR,1. B. ( 1980). "Aggregate dynamia and staggered contracts". Jourrwl oj Pulitical Ecunomy,
88. PP. I -23.
ToutN, 1. ( 1965). "Money and economic growth". Ecunomrrrica, 33, pp. 671-84.
Reprint Seriea, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
No. 1 G. Narini and F. van der Plceg, Monetary end fiscal policy in an
opti~ising ~odel with capitel accuaulation and finite lives,
The Econwic Journal, Vol. 98, No. 392, 1988, pp. 772 - 786.
No. 2 F. van der Plceg, International policy coordinetion in interdependent
wnetary econo~ies, Journal of International Econoaica, Vol 25, 1988,
pp. 1 - 23.
No. 3 A.P. Barten, The history of Dutch ~acroeconwic ~odelling
(1936-1986), in W. Dríehuis, M.M.G. Fase and H. den Hartog (eds.),
Challengea for Nacrcecono~íc Modelling, Contributiona to Econo~ic
Malysia 178, A~sterda~: North-Hollend, 1988, pp. 39 - 88.
No. 4 F. van der Ploeg, Dísposable inco~e, uneaploy~ent, ínflation and
state apendíng in a dynasic politicsl-econo~íc wdel, Public Choice,
vo1. 60. 1989. PP. 211 - 239.
No. 5 Th. ten Raa and F. van der Plceg, A statiatical approach to the
proble~ of negativea in input-output enelysis, Econo~ic Modelling,
vol. 6, No. 1, 1989, pp. 2- 19.
No. 6 E. van Deo.e, Renegotiation-proof equilibria ín repeated prisoners'
dile~a, Journal of Econooic Theocy, Vol. 47, No. 1, 1989,
PP. 206 - 217.
No. 7 C. Mulder end F. van der Plceg, Trade unions, invest.ent and
eaployaent in a seall open econo~y: e Dutch perspective, in J.
Muysken and C. de Neubourg ( eds.), Uneaploy~ent in Europe, London:
The MacMillan Press Ltd, 1989, PP. 2~ - 229.
No. 8 Th. van de Klundert and F. van der Plceg, Wage rigidity and capital
aobility in an optiaizing ~odel of a saall open econo~y, De Econonist
137. nr. 1, 1989. Pp. 47 - 75.
No. 9 G. Dhaene and A.P. Barten, When it all began: the 1936 Tinbergen
~odel revisited, Econo~ic Modelling, Vol. 6, No. 2, 1989,
pp. 203 - 219.
No. 10 F. van der Ploeg and A.J. de Zeeuw, Conflict over ar.s accuaulation
in ~erket and command econoaiea, in F. ven der Plceg and A.J. de
Zeeuw (eds.), Dynamic Policy Gsaes in Econo~ics, Contributions to
Economic Analysis 181, Aasterdea: Elaevier Scíence Publishers B.V.
(North-Holland), 1989. PP. 91 - 119.
No. 11 J. Dríffill, Macrcecono~íc policy gaaes with incoaplete inforoation:
sooe extensions, in F. van der Plceg and A.J. de Zeeuw (eds.),
Dvnaaic Policy Gemes in Econooics, Contributíons [o Econo~ic Malysis
181, Aasterdaa: Elsevier Science Publíahers B.V. (North-Holland),
1989. PP. 289 - 322.
Nu. 12 6'. ven der Plceg, Towards ~onetery integration in Europe, in P.
De Grauwe e.s., De Europese Monetaire Integre[ie: vier visies,
Netenscheppelijke Raed voor het Regeríngabeleid V 66, 's-Grevenhage:
SUU uítgeveri}, 1989, pp. 81 - 106.
No. 13 R.J.M. Alessie and A. Kepteyn, Conaumption, sevings end demography,
in A. Wenig, K.F. Zimmermenn (eda.), Demographic Chenge and Economic
Development, Berlin~Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 1989, pp. 272 - 305.
No. 14 A. Hoque, J.R. Magnus end B. Pesaren, The exact multi-períod mean-
square forecast error for the first-order sutoregresaive model,
Journal of Econometrics, Vol. 39. No. 3, 1988. PP. 327 - 346.
No. 15 R. Alessie, A. Kapteyn and B. Melenberg, The effecta of liquidity
constraints on consumption: estimation from household penel data,
Euroyean Econwic Review 33. No. 2~3. 1989. PP. 547 - 555.
No. 16 A. Holly end J.R. Magnus, A note on ínatrumental veriables and
maximum likelihood estimation procedures, Mnalea d'Économie et de
Statistique, No. 10, April-June, 1988, pp. 121 - 138.
No. 17 P. ten Hacken, A. Kapteyn and I. lioittiez, Unemployment benefits and
the labor market, a micro~mecro approech, in B.A. Oustafsaon end N.
Mders Klevmarken (eds.), The Political Economy of Social Security,
Contributions to Economic Malysis 179, Amsterdea: Elsevier Science
Publishers B.V. (North-Holland), 1989, pp. 143 - 164.
No. 18 T. Nansbeek and A. Kapteyn, Estimation of the error-components model
with incomplete penels, Journel of Econometrics, Vol. 41, No. 3,
1989. PP. 341 - 361.
No. 19 A. Kapteyn, P. Kooreman end R. Nillemse, Some methodologicel issues
in the implementation of subjective poverty definitions, The Journal
of Human Resources, Vol. 23, No. 2, 1988, pp. 222 - 242.
No. 20 Th. van de Klundert end F. van der Plceg, Fiscal policy and finite
lives in interdependent economies with real and nominal wage
rigidity, Oxford Economic Papers, Vol. 41, No. 3, 1989. PP. 459 -
489.
No. 21 J.R. Magnus and B. Pesaran, The exect multi-period mean-square
forecast error foc the first-order autoregressive model with an
intercept, Journel of Econometrics, Vol. 42, No. 2, 1989.
pp. 157 - 179.
No. 22 F. van der Plceg, Two esseys on politicel economy: (i) The political
economy of overvaluation, The Econwic Journal, Vol. 99, No. 397.
1989, Pp. 850 - 855~ (11) Election outcomes end the stockmerket,
European Journal of Politícal Economy, Vol. 5, No. i, 1989, pp. 21 -
30.
No. 23 J.R. Magnus and A.D. Moodlend, On the maximum likelihood estimation
of multiveriate regression models containing serielly correlated
error components, Internetional Economic Review, Vol. 29, No. 4,
1988. PP. 707 - 725.
No. 24 A.J.J. Telmen and Y. Yeaemoto, A aiapliciel algoritfu for atetionary
point problema on polytopea, Methe~etics of Operationa Research, Vol.
14, No. 3. 1989. Pp. 383 - 399.
No. 25 E. van Daoe, Stable equilibria and forwerd inductíon, Journel of
Economic Theory, vol. 48. No. 2, 1989, pp. 476 - 496.
No. 26 A.P. Barten and L.]. Bettendorf, Price formation of fiah: M
epplicstion of en inverse de~and syatea, Bu~ropean Economic Review,
Vol. 33. No- 8, 1989. DP- 1509 - 1525.
No. 27 0. Noldeke and E. van Desme, Signalling in e dyna~ic labour market,
Review of Econoeic Studiea, Vol. 57 (1), no. 189. 1990, pp. 1- 23
No. 28 P. Kop Jansen end Th. ten Res, The choice af eodel in the
conatruction of input-output coefficients eatricea, Internetionel
Econo.ic Re~iew. vo1. 31, no. 1. 1990. PP. 213 - 227.
No. 29 F. van der Plceg end A.J. de Zeeuw, Perfect equilibriue ín a model of
competitive srms eccunulstion, Internetionel Economic Review, vol.
31, no. 1, 1990, pp. 131 - 146.
No. 30 J.R. Negnus end A.D. Woodland, Sepsrability end Aggregation,
Econoeics, vol. 57, no. 226, 1990, pp. 239 - 247.
No. 31 F. van der Ploeg, Internetionsl interdependence and policy
coordinetion in econo~iae with resl and nominel wage rigídity, (lreek
Bconomíc Review, vol. 10, no. 1, June 1988, pp. 1- 48.
No. j2 E. ven Desme, Signaling end forward lnduction in a market entry
context, retione Reaearch Proceedi s 1 8, Rerlín-Neidelberg:
Springer-Verleg, 1990, pp. 5- 59.
No. 33 A.P. Barten, Toward a levela veraion of the Rotterdam and related
demend aystess, Contributiona to retiona Research end Economics
Cembridge: NIT Press, 19 9, pp. 1- 65.
No. 34 F. ven der Plceg, International coordinetíon of monetary policies
under alternative exchange-rate regimea, Advenced Lecturea in
Qusntitntive Economics, London-Orlendo: Acadeeic Presa Ltd., 1990,
pp. 91 - 121.
No. 35 Th. van de Klundert, On aocíceconomic ceusea of 'wait unemployment',
European Econoeic Review, vol. 34, no. 5, 1990, pp. 1011 - 1022.
No. 36 R.J.N. Alesaíe, A. Kapteyn, J.B. van Lochea end T.J. Wensbeek,
Indívidual effecta !n utillty conaiatent models of demand, in J.
Nartog, O. Ridder end J. Theeuwea (eda.), Panel Date and Labor
Nerket Studiea, Amaterdam: Elaevier Science Publiahera B.V. (Nortl~-
Nolland). 1990, pp. 253 - 278.
No. 37 F. ven der Plceg, Capitel accumuletion, lnflatlon and long-run
conflict in internetionel ob~ectivea, Oxford Economic Pepers, vol.
42. no. 3. 1990. PP- 501 - 525.
PO. BOX 90153. 5000 I F TII Rl IRC~ THF nIFTN~RI ANb:
Bibliotheek K. U. Brabanti i ~~~~~~~~e~~~~u m~~~ i
